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1 Introduction
If you’ve ever watched the long-running TV show Air Crash Investigations,
you will know that there is hardly ever one cause of a disaster. What might
start as a small stress fracture overlooked by an inattentive and preoccu-
pied engineer with debt problems may progressively grow into a crack. The
crack may cause a rare leak. The leak may trigger a warning in the cockpit.
The warning may be misunderstood by crew. When other warnings begin to
sound, the crew may be confused by information. They may become over-
whelmed due to poor crew resource management training, resulting from a
hurriedly-prepared and ill-executed training regime. The process of iden-
tifying what went wrong will hopefully uncover these concurrent chains of
events, and emphasise that to ensure air safety, attention needs to be paid
to the underlying causes that enabled problems to develop in the first place.
In some instances, the cracks that are revealed may require the entire disci-
pline to be rethought, as the causes do not lend themselves to easy fixes. All
accidents will involve a human element, although in some that will be more
readily apparent than others.
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Today, I want to encourage you to think about the problems that have
stemmed from the exercise of the charging discretion as the air crash that
we are going to investigate. What is the crash I am referring to? Well, we
know the ICC Prosecutor’s exercise of the charging discretion led to the OTP
obtaining more acquittals and failed prosecutions than convictions. We know
that this failure rate so much higher than the ICTY, or the ICTR, or the
SCSL. We know that significant amounts of time and money are being spent
on investigations and prosecutions for charges that do not stand up in court.
And we know the issue of cumulative charging has attracted controversy for
what is seen by some as an overburdening of defence and poor prosecutorial
preparation.
At the same time, the charging discretion is the most important impor-
tant discretion that international prosecutors enjoy. As the ‘gatekeepers’ to
international courts,1 international prosecutors have the life of international
criminal law in their hands. There is no other discretion singularly more
important to the fulfilment of an international court’s mandated objectives
than the decision of who to charge and what to charge them with.
Perhaps it isn’t surprising that criticisms of the charging discretion flow
free and fast, and with them, many opinions about just how it should be
exercised. Yet none seem to gain traction.
All of this begs the question: can the exercise of the charging discretion
be improved?
I do not intend to provide an answer to this. Instead, I want to present
you with some information that might cause you to question charging prac-
tice. Perhaps it will be food for thought; ideas that you can raise with
your colleagues and friends; the impetus for a discussion that we can have
together.
My presentation this afternoon is divided into three parts. First, I will
explore with you how the charging discretion has historically been exercised.
1 Lovisa Bådagård and Mark Klamberg, ‘The Gatekeeper of the ICC - Prosecutorial
strategies for selecting situations and cases at the International Criminal Court’ (2017)
48(5) Georgetown Journal of International Law 639; Héctor Olásolo, ‘The prosecutor
of the ICC before the initiation of investigations: A quasi-judicial or a political body?’
(2003) 3 International Criminal Law Review 87, 89.
2 Second,
Second, we will delve into the rationales that have underpinned charging.
Third, I will give you my thoughts on the root causes of the varied charging
practices. And fourth, I will suggest some ways forward.
While listening, I invite you not to distinguish issues concerning cumu-
lative charging and charging. I also invite you to think about the charging
discretion from, perhaps, a different perspective—one that places the focus
on mindsets of the people exercising the discretion; leaving policy-based ap-
proaches in the background.
After all, in our collective mission to find what caused the air crash, it is
appropriate we rethink the way we look at controversial topics. It is excellent
that projects like this exist for this purpose.
Before I go any further, it is important to note that I have no interest in
the results of this study. The information I am going to show you are simply
my observations. I am funded by the University of Leiden, and not by any
actor with an interest in what I am looking at.
2 Charging in numbers
The first things I would like to do is show you the charging discretion in
numbers. Perhaps these historical figures can be seen as benchmarks by
which we can assess best practices.
From 1995 onwards—the year that the first final charging document was
issued—to December 2018, international prosecutors at the ICTY, ICTR,
SCSL, and ICC have issued 195 final charging documents accusing 298 de-
fendants of 2,774 core international crimes.
On average, defendants at these courts will be faced with just over 9 core
international crimes. The actual figure is 9.3. The figures between each court
vary a little bit. At the ICTY, the number is 10; the ICTR it is just 6; the
SCSL it’s 13; and at the ICC, the number is 12.
In Figure 1, we can see the average number of charges laid against indi-
vidual defendants on a year-to-year basis. These numbers are averages: for
each year, the total number of charges per individual were added up and
then divided by the number of individuals charged. If we look at the ICTY,
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Figure 1: The average number of charges per defendant.
the ICTR, and the SCSL, we can see that the average number of charges
was pretty consistent. The grey dotted line is the trend, and you can see it
is also pretty flat.
Consistency has many benefits, of course: it allows people to better plan
their future and the resources they will probably need to do their jobs. And it
might mean that everyone has a pretty similar understanding of the number
of charges it is reasonable for a defendant to face.
But look at the ICC. What’s going on here? The data is all over the
place. There are huge peaks in 2004, 2007, and 2015, the years in which final
charging documents were issued for Otti, Harun, Kushayb, and Ongwen.
These numbers are very different from the stable, consistent averages we see
at the other courts.
If the average number of charges per defendant at all courts is 9.3, why
do we have these years where the average spikes to 30?2 Or 32?3 What about
46?4 That’s 5 times the average. It’s interesting, too, that this variation is
seen only in one court.
2 In 2015.
3 In 2004.
4 In 2007.
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Figure 2: The distribution of charges per individual.
More charges mean more time and money need to be invested in laying
them; they also mean more attention needs to be given to evidence at trials
to ensure the elements of each offence are met—or not met.
So with this in mind, what is the marginal benefit that comes from laying
45 charges as opposed to 46? And is this justifiable in light of the benefits
that come from laying the average 9 charges? An interesting question to
ponder is whether it is more important for prosecutors to justify the number
of charges by reference to the benefits they bring, the further that number
strays upwards from the expected mean.
Let’s look at the same data differently. Figure 2 is a box plot. These
whiskers represent the top 25% and bottom 25% of charges against each
individual. The coloured boxes in the middle are the middle 50%. The lines
in the middle are the median points, or the ‘middle-most’ number once the
number of charges for each individual are arranged from the highest to the
lowest.
Looking at the total plot, we can see that the middle 50% of charge
numbers are hovering around between 5 and 12. But here we also see some-
thing interesting happening (ignore the SCSL). The data is not normally dis-
tributed. It’s skewed towards the higher numbers. You can see the range for
the top 50% of charge numbers is far greater than the bottom 50%. In other
words, if prosecutors have the choice between laying more or fewer charges,
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Figure 3: Summary of core international crimes.
they seem to be erring on laying more—sometimes a lot more. What does
this mean for consistency or predictability? And does this mean we should
look closer at what goals are sought to be achieved by exercising the charging
discretion, that might explain why we see this skewness?
Let’s then shift our focus to the core international crimes. How are they
represented in these 2,774 charges? Figure 3 gives us an overview of how
core crimes have appeared in indictments overall. Across the ICTY, ICTR,
SCSL, and ICC, crimes against humanity constitute 42.6% of all charges laid;
and war crimes, which are the most common charges, make up 47.6% of all
charges. Genocide, the ‘crime of crimes’, comes in at only 9.8% of all charges.
Now let’s present this data differently to see whether this pattern exists
on a year-to-year basis. Figure 4 shows a mess. But this isn’t really surprising
because the context of the situation will determine the core crimes that are
charged.
But where you would expect to see a pattern is with respect to charges
for sexual and gender-based violence. After all, books have been written,
policies have been created, and staff have been hired to ensure the effective
prosecution of this class of offences.
Figure 5 shows the number of charges for those crimes with an express
sexual or gender element as a percentage of all charges laid each year over
the last 24 years. Again: it’s a mess. If there is a trend, it’s still a very weak
one. Maybe this surprises you. Maybe it doesn’t.
I suggest that the data I have just shown you raises some interesting ques-
tions about the value of using statistics as quality benchmarks with respect
to the number of charges alleged against individuals and the implementation
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of policy goals.
It also leads me in to the next two issues I would like to explore with
you: why do prosecutors charge what they do? Can we explain this messy
data by reference to the reasons that prosecutors have used to justify their
charging decisions?
3 Rationales for charging
Over the last year I’ve been speaking with current and former international
criminal prosecutors who held the rank of Senior Trial Attorney and above
regarding what factors they considered to be important when exercising the
charging discretion. I’ve tried, as much as possible, to let these people speak
with minimal prompting using broad, open-ended, and often very simplistic
questions.
We should assume, of course, that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, all prosecutors are trying to do make the best decisions they can in
any given circumstance. Therefore, the insights provided allow us to reflect
on what those people on the ground consider relevant to making high-quality
decisions.
I do not claim that any of these reasons that I am about to describe to
you are the primary cause for why the charging discretion has been exercised
in the way that it has. I do not claim that they are considered by every
prosecutor in each case. I also do not claim that these views are widely held.
Instead, I want to use these explanations to paint a picture of a decision-
making process that is informed by a plethora of different considerations
that may or may not have application in each specific case.
3.1 The number of charges
First, let’s turn to some of the factors that appear to have influenced the deci-
sions of prosecutors regarding how many charges to allege against a potential
defendant.
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3.1.1 Desire for convictions
The desire to obtain convictions is obviously a big one.
This is hardly surprising. Schabas has said that international criminal
law “thrives on conviction”.5 Damaška has similarly argued that a failure to
obtain convictions would herald the failure of ICL in its primary mission to
‘end impunity’.6 One might wonder, in light of recent ICC OTP practice,
whether the trumpets are already sounding.
Even if we are to put questions of whether conviction and punishment
actually results in general (or even specific) deterrence aside—and there are
legitimate questions, particularly in the ICL context—convictions neverthe-
less demonstrate that the incredible amount of resources that are being put
into international criminal investigations are being appropriately spent. A
conviction is a vindication of not only the work that has been done, but also
the suffering of the victims.
But we should also not ignore the fact that some defendants are seen to
fit in a unique category of extraordinary maliciousness. Completely aside
from any lofty desire to fulfil the aims of international criminal justice, this
itself has, in some instances, warranted charging a defendant with numerous
crimes to increase the likelihood that a conviction will be entered against
them. One prosecutor has noted, for example, that while it would not be
suitable to “double up on war crimes and crimes against humanity” in every
case, the alleged maliciousness of a particular defendant “warranted using
everything in our armoury to get him” and that “on that basis alone, it was
appropriate to use all relevant crimes in the Statute that applied to what
he’d done”.7
5 William Schabas, ‘Balancing the Rights of the Accused with the Imperatives of Ac-
countability’ in Ramesh Thakur and Peter Malcontent (eds), From Sovereign Impunity
to International Accountability: The search for justice in a world of states (United Na-
tions University Press, 2004) 154, 165.
6 Mirjan Damaška, ‘Reflections on Fairness in International Criminal Justice’ (2012)
10(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 611, 613.
7 Interview with P19.
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3.1.2 Advancing the law
Prosecutors have also demonstrated a desire to advance the law through their
charging. The law is in a constant state of development and reinvention.
Since 1993, practitioners have been ‘discovering’ new crimes that were not
necessarily envisaged a quarter of a century ago. Judges are given most of
the credit for this, with one scholar noting that judicial creativity involves
“the sculpting of the relatively featureless granite of existing law in order to
give it form, effect, and reason”.8
But the role of prosecutors in this process of law creation must not be
understated, nor their willingness to engage in it. After all, creative charging
practices have led to the development of the law in several areas. We can
see this, in particular, with respect to sexual and gender-based violence and
terrorising the civilian population.
Some prosecutors lept on the opportunity to advance the law with an
enthusiastic sense of duty. As noted by one prosecutor, “you really want
to build the law and you want to use the opportunity to do it”.9 Another
reflected that the undeveloped state of international humanitarian law meant
that its development “needed to be pursued” and saw the development of the
law as part of their mandate (although, when questioned further about the
sense of being mandated to advance the law, they explained that this was
“putting it too high” and that they misspoke).10
The desire to advance the law had practical consequences for how the
charging discretion was exercised. One ICTY prosecutor reflected that, at
least in the early days of the ICTY, there was what they termed a “policy” for
all investigators, and “in particular, the Senior Trial Attorneys”, under which
“they should not be afraid to advance legal arguments and legal theories in
prosecuting the cases”.11 However, this was on the proviso that they needed
8 Joseph Powderly, ‘Judicial Interpretation at the Ad Hoc Tribunals: Method From
Chaos?’ in Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds), Judicial Creativity at the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 1st ed, 2010) 17, 18.
9 Interview with P9.
10 Interview with P4.
11 Interview with P4.
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to maintain a more traditional, fallback position just in case.12
3.1.3 Macro objectives and public expectations
We cannot ignore, too, the reality that international criminal courts are
burdened with many objectives and are expected to bring about positive
change in society and leave behind them a legacy.
One prosecutor considered the benefits of setting an historical record
warranted charging a potential defendant with all possible crimes that it
was believed they committed. “I think starting at the beginning there was
an unspoken policy”, they said, “that you should charge [a defendant] with
pretty much everything you could prove against them”. The rationale for
this belief, they explained, is that war crimes trials, certainly in cases where
the leadership is being prosecuted, “do have a role in telling a full story even
though [prosecutors are] not there to write history”.13
3.1.4 Representation
Perhaps the most significant factor that has informed the number of charges
a defendant will be faced with is the desire for prosecutors to lay represen-
tational charges. But representative of what? It depends on who you ask.
Some would say criminality. Charges should, in the words of one prosecu-
tor, capture the “essence of what happened on the ground” through a curated
set of charges that can be said to be representative of other uncharged acts.14
You can see this in Regulation 34(2) of the ICC OTP’s Regulations of the
Office of the Prosecutor. Others might add structural commission. Charges
should reflect the different ways through which alleged offences were com-
mitted. Add temporal spread to the list to ensure that an entire conflict is
covered. Don’t forget the alleged victims, either. The charges should reflect
the different types of people who were allegedly harmed through an act.
12 Interview with P4.
13 Interview with P11.
14 Interview with P14.
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3.1.5 More or fewer charges?
As I have already mentioned, I do not intend to hold these rationales out
as being a complete set of reasons that prosecutors have employed to justify
their charging decisions. All I do is offer these as examples of factors that
prosecutors have employed in their assessment of how many charges to lay
against an accused.
The elements that I have discussed could conceivably cause cumulative
charging, or the spikes in the data. But importantly, some of them, and
many others, have also caused prosecutors to lay fewer—not more—charges.
For example, I mentioned earlier a desire for convictions. While this has
caused some indictments to grow, it has also caused them to shrink or remain
limited if the prosecutor with carriage believed that the alleged defendant
would nevertheless receive a fair or lengthy sentence if they were convicted.
Macro managerial considerations are also a good example of a slimming
factor. The pressure encountered by both the ICTY and the ICTR to wrap
up their operations placed pressures on the OTP in terms of identifying
which charges to proceed with, forcing them to be prudent with respect to
the number of charges alleged against each defendant.
Individual trial management also operates in the same way. At the end of
the day, prosecutors need to be able to run trials pragmatically and lengthy
indictments may make this difficult. The Karadžić indictment was, for ex-
ample, reduced in part because of a desire to have a manageable trial that
did not last exceedingly long.
Criticism from the judiciary is also known to have played a role in reducing
the size of indictments. Rule 73 bis of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence allowed the Chamber to ‘invite’ the Prosecution to reduce the scope
of the indictment. On a more personal level, one prosecutor noted that they
could “almost feel the judge wince” when they laid a lengthy indictment for
a short course of conduct that was basically murder. Anyone who has ever
attracted the ire of the bench for proceeding with superfluous charges knows
the feeling is one to be avoided.
Finally, while one might argue that lengthy indictments enhance the
12 prospect
prospect of a conviction, they might simultaneously create misconceptions
in the broader community about the state of the evidence or what they
should expect from the prosecution, militating in favour of the number of
charges being reduced.
3.2 The types of charges
While the factors that I have just discussed can be somewhat neatly cate-
gorised as going to the number of charges laid, they will never be considered
alone.
There are many other considerations that factor into the charging dis-
cretion than I have explained today. I spoke only briefly about the policies
concerning the type of criminal conduct warranting the attention of the pros-
ecution, such as sexual and gender-based crimes or crimes against children.
I haven’t touched at all on the relevance of arrests; the need for efficiency;
conceptions of fairness; previous representations made by prosecutors to De-
fence and states; the likelihood of a defendant suffering harm as a result of the
charges; procedural factors; the budget; other pressures from states; or the
simple prospect of actually being able to conduct a successful prosecution.
The list goes on.
The point here is that while it is easy to pinpoint factors that taken by
themselves appear to have affected the exercise of the charging discretion
and can explain the numbers, it is not a discretion that lends itself to an
easy, clear-cut analysis from which patterns can be derived and the future
predicted.
There is heavy degree of ‘instinctive synthesis’ involved. All of these
factors—and undoubtedly many more—are pulled together and synthesised
by people who, presumably in good faith, attempt to make what they see
are the most quality charging decisions possible in the circumstances. And
they do this by drawing upon their backgrounds, experiences in prosecution,
and desires for the court or the broader ICL field.
13
4 What is causing these differences?
So what’s causing all of these different views and these varied practices? I’m
going to suggest two factors that might be at play.
4.1 Goal confusion
The first factor, I think, is that prosecutors have many aspirations for what
courts and the field should be doing. Back in 2008, Damaška called in-
ternational criminal courts out for self-imposing a gargantuan number of
objectives. Unlike Atlas, he argued, these courts are not “bodies of ti-
tanic strength, capable of carrying on their shoulders the burden of so many
tasks”.15 But, as we have seen, even the job of identifying and prioritising
these goals is problematic. And if you can, then maybe the problem becomes
trying to get everyone on the same page.
Is the goal of prosecutors to obtain convictions? What about providing
a forum in which victims can tell their stories? Do prosecutors need to
consider the role their work has in creating an historical narrative? Should
international prosecutors strive to exercise the charging discretion in a way
that ensures the survival of their court and to build its legitimacy? What
about ensuring the survival of the field? There is no doubt that prosecutors
have considered these questions—even if not explicitly—when determining
who to charge and what to charge them with. All of them are laudable.
4.2 Inherent subjectivity
This leads into the second, and more pragmatic issue. The charging discretion
is one that is steeped in subjectivity. There’s no way around this, and will
surprise none of you. To again quote and appropriate Schabas, there is no
‘iPhone app’ that tells prosecutors what is relevant and the weight to be
given to any one particular factor. People are, quite simply, going to have
different ideas about what are or are not relevant considerations.
15 Mirjan Damaška, ‘What’s the point of international criminal justice?’ (2008) 83(1)
Chicago-Kent Law Review 329, 331.
14 What
What weight should prosecutors give to maintaining a positive relation-
ship with the bench? Should prosecutors consider the prospect of a defen-
dant entering custody? What weight should they give to prosecuting the
same conduct in different ways so that they can look back and, with good
conscience say, ‘well, at least we tried’?
These fundamental questions have no answer, and it is wrong to proceed
on the assumption that they do. Moreover, and more importantly, there
is certainly no guidance as to how these broadly-defined and vague consid-
erations translate into concrete and tangible advice as to how prosecutors
should act in any given situation.
5 Moving forward
So, with the knowledge that past practice is fragmented and laced with sub-
jectivity, how do we move forward?
Perhaps we need to place more emphasis on the point that everyone has
different understandings of what is a quality decision. All prosecutors are
undoubtedly trying to do the best job that they can do in the circumstances
of each case in the context of the role as they understand it.
But they seem trapped in an unenviable position: unable to satisfy the
expectations of the broader community of actors regarding how the charging
discretion should be exercised, they are subjected to eternal cycle of criticism.
Two things seem to be at play. First, we never know all the reasons
prosecutors charge the way they do in each case. It’s unreasonable to expect
that we should. Second, Koskenniemi, Robinson, and Stahn have convinc-
ingly shown that no matter what justification is raised to support a charging
decision, there will always be an argument for the opposing side. Such is our
profession.
This afternoon, I have invited you to look at the charging discretion in
a different light by embracing subjectivity and looking at the mindsets of
the people exercising the charging discretion. Hopefully, what I have shown
you reveals that the exercise of the charging discretion is, at its core, driven
by a prosecutor’s own judgement about what is best in the circumstances.
15 Someone’s
Someone’s mindset, I suggest, is the most powerful motivating factor behind
why they make the decisions that they do.
And we can’t change mindsets without having open, honest discussions
about what makes people tick. Through these deeper discussions that tran-
scend the mere issues of the evidence or the policies, we can get a much better
understanding of what prosecutors actually want—and why they want them.
These discussions are particularly important to have for those cases that,
like the spikes on my graph, stand out as being statistically different from the
rest. They’re not inherently wrong. Perhaps the reasons why we see these
differences will make everyone think about a new best practice?
In other words, instead of trying to create guidelines; or a committee; or
a working group; or a policy paper to try to list what should or should not be
considered in the exercise of the charging discretion, maybe we should think
about simply changing the way we look at and discuss the topic of charging.
The beauty of this is that it requires no change to existing work pro-
cesses. It’s simply about how people engage with these processes and their
colleagues. Of course, this may take time. It requires trust, and a heavy dose
of introspection. But by looking at the problems surrounding charging and
cumulative charging in a different way, we may be able to look beyond the
cracks and see their causes.
Because if there’s one thing that binge-watching Air Crash Investigations
teaches the procrastinating viewer, it’s that the problems are rarely what
they seem on the surface. Quality control runs far deeper.
Thank you.
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